Should prisoners have the right to vote? If you ask the man in the street, by far-and-away the majority will say, ‘No.’ If you ask our politicians, by far-and-away the majority will say, ‘No.’ If you ask the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) in Strasbourg, they will unequivocally say, ‘Yes.’
Why should such a discrepancy exist and why should I feel that the perspective of the ECHR is something that should carry a greater weighting than that of much of Joe Public or many of our politicians? Let me explain.
Created in 1959, the ECHR offered another level of protection to organisations, states and individuals from manipulation, violation of rights, mistreatment and improper trial conduct. The UK government signed up to being a member of the Council of Europe, the human rights body that runs the ECHR, because it demonstrated values (respect, fairness, justice, tolerance etc.) aligned to those important within UK . In accepting this, a bench-mark was being laid down against which those who felt they had been improperly treated could draw upon. A values-based model was in position and could clearly provide a framework within which to work.
Today, five decades later, because the ECHR has deemed it a breach of prisoner’s rights to deny them the opportunity to vote in general elections, there is talk of withdrawing the UK’s association with the ECHR. In the corridors of power and on the street, indignant voices are heard to say, ‘It’s none of their business. They have no jurisdiction to enforce law that contravenes the UK Constitution.’
So what changed? On the one hand, nothing; I’m sure that the government would still stand by those shared values. When one is clear about one’s values, they act as both a strong foundation from which to build as well as a compass to provide clear direction, when faced with challenging decisions.
On the other hand, while the voting-rights of any individual entering prison have been denied since 1870, a decision upheld by the Representation of the People Act, 1983, prisoner John Hirst challenged this in 2004. While this wasn’t the first challenge against the ruling, it was (probably) the first time using the framework of European Court of Human Rights and they decided that it was unlawful.
However, crime and punishment is an emotive subject. It is for this reason that I suggest that the ECHR may have a more balanced perspective of this for they do not allow their emotions to ‘get the better of them’ in the way that someone so close to the situation would. The Judges, one for each country that has signed the European Human Rights Convention, do not represent their countries’ interests in the court, but are individuals who must be completely impartial.
It is not possible for the public to be completely impartial and indeed it is seen that they have a biased perspective of crime? Three quarters of the population think that crime is rising nationally, even though it has actually continued to fall since the mid 90’s. This appears to be sustained even in years when both recorded crime and victimisation surveys point to reductions in overall crime. Of course, politicians must take account of the public’s false perception of increasing levels of crime.
Also, the weighting against the types of crimes committed are perceived incorrectly. There is a tendency to think that crime involving violence is much more common than it actually is – the current figure is 19%. This would suggest that the concomitant emotion level might also be too high.
We are so influenced by our emotions. Whether we are talking about prisoner’s rights, cuts in education provision, or the closure of some national institution, the affect of emotional involvement means that facts will become obscured, decision-making will be more reactive, more protective of limited, closed views, and the weighting between the different elements of the argument will be more unbalanced.
Emotion is a smoke-screen that blinds, confuses and imposes limitation. When there is a degree of separation from a situation, when one is able to stand back and observe from the different angles and then things are seen ‘in a different light.’
If the decision-making process is one that can be conducted free from the straight-jacket of emotion then, at the end of the day, all parties have been given time and attention, opinion acknowledged and valued, and the process unfolded with transparency. In this manner, while consensus may not have achieved, the foundation that underpins the final decision is considerably stronger than it would otherwise have been as respect for all parties has been upheld.
